The Perfectly Designed Chaos - or How Can We Stop the Running Amok of an Imperfect Software on a Faulty Hardware

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How Can We STOP

the Amok Run of an Imperfect Software on a Faulty Hardware

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
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The perfectly designed chaosThe Perfectly Designed Chaos or How Can We STOP the Amok Run of an Imperfect Software

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INFOGEM Conference January 27, 1997 A. Pataricza Importance of Dependability: Is the story of computer applications a SUCCESS or a HORROR story? Some NEGATIVE experiences collected from a very long list: USA: approximately 4 billion \$/year damage/year Several accidents: radiation therapy - airplane - Ariane 5 Collapse of stock exchange, phone and banking systems Administration: - invoice on autopsy (vivisection?) Internet The perfectly designed chaos Importance of Dependability: INFOGEM Conference A. Pataricza January 27, 1997 Dependability "The thrustworthyness of a computer system such that reliance can be justifiably placed on the services it delivers" (IFIP WG 10.4 / Laprie) Fault ⇒Error ⇒Failure Error Service Failure Error Murphy **Product** Fault The perfectly designed chaos Dependability

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January 27, 1997 **INFOGEM** Conference A. Pataricza Means for dependability Phase Fault handling Implementation Target Design & Prevention Avoidance manufacturing Before service (= no faults, Fault technology please) Removal Testing Robustness Self-confidence ? (=Russian roulette) Redundancy Tolerance - time (= proper service in spite of - performance Failure **During service** faults) hardware -information - data Forecasting acquisition Fault (= be readyfor faults) prediction

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Means for dependability

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Dependability attributes

IEC 1069-5


- · Reliability: correct operation for a defined period of time
- · Availability: ability in a correct operational state for a defined period of time
- Safety: avoidance of catastrophes
- · Security: assurance to withstand unauthorized/ incorrect inputs

Credibility:

Recognition/signalization of correct/ incorrect system state

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Dependability attributes



Standard solutions

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CPU-MMU

· Illegal opcode

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- · Arithmetic errors
- Bus error
- Memory address range access rights (fetch, read, read/write) checks only task level no fine granular checks (the entire address range of a task is uniformly mapped)
- Similar object/function oriented implementation,
 like index checks not (really) supported
 (need for user supervisor user mode context switching + MMU prg.)
- Fault tolerance/ latency?
- Supervisor mode unprotected

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Standard solutions


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January 27, 1997 **INFOGEM** Conference A. Pataricza Master-checker Two processors connected pin-by-pin on the bus running the same application Lock-step operation Comparison of the values at each signal write operation 100% fault coverage for CPU-internal single errors, but 0% fault coverage for CPU-external errors Hardware overhead: 1 chip???/ 100%??? No performance loss Integrated comparators: e.g. Intel 585.995 Similar principle at the higher levels of HW: Sun Sparc High Availability server,... The perfectly designed chaos Master-checker January 27, 1997 **INFOGEM** Conference A. Pataricza Watch-dog processor Simple co-processor checking the *control-flow* of the application program Signatures (numerical labels) assigned to the (high-level) instructions at precompile time Signatures transferred to the WDP at run time Signature transfer Main Watchdog processor processor Alarm signal Syntactic check of the label sequence but: no data dependencies E.g.: IF-THEN-ELSE: both THEN branch and ELSE branch accepted selection unchecked The perfectly designed chaos Watch-dog processor

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Evaluation of WDP

- 60-80% coverage for control faults, assures the execution of data checks
- 10-20% performance loss
- · Short error latency vs. communication ba(n)dwith
- SW implementation possible but reasonable only if the WDP runs on another processor SMP, or distributed
- Check of *multitasking* (process synchronization) possible (CSP-like)
- No COTS support till yet, but low complexity

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Evaluation of WDP

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Summary

- Trend: COTS solutions economical solutions: dedicated CPU MIPS/ COTS MIPS = 10⁶
- Only partial solutions offered as products by equipment vendors
 no fault tolerant bus standard in the traditional COTS products =>add-on

COST EXPLOSION

- Solution: dependable system architecture computer level redundancy software + hardware
- Hardware fault detection techniques can be adopted to software, especially in parallel/distributed environments:
 - + independence of the checker and checks assured
 - communication bandwidth
 - error latency fail safety not assured

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Summary

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Software solution: Hierarchy of checks/strategies

Algorithm based fault tolerance:

problem related additional information

- credibility checks (limit, simplified model based check)
- inverse calculations

hard to implement as a uniform *mechanism*, only as a problem dependent *measure*

- + to a limited extent human errors (input data) can be checked
- Syntax based checks compile-time structure needed:

strict type, range checks interface checks restricted call structure (OO?) predictable task sequence (CSP-like?)

Checkpoints, rollback recovery:

problems in reactive systems

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Software solution: Hierarchy of checks/strategies

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Redundant data structures:

double linking of lists checksum-like protection of operations and data structures ("total" in financial tables, parity-like protected matrix operations)

· Fault tolerant elementary operations:

atomic transaction processing fault tolerant commit protocols

- Uniform interface: exception handling
- · Validation:

huge cardinality of the candidate faults \Longrightarrow statistical methods simulated fault injection (radiation, bus signal or software) no validated fault model on the effect of the transient faults

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Software solution: Hierarchy of checks/strategies

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Open problems

- · Predictable dependability requires (nearly) deterministic control flow
- · Hard to solve problems:
 - dependable real-time systems (responsive systems)
 - distributed, reactive applications
- Implementation techniques
 - performance ⇔ determinism (load depending task migration)
 - run-time determined control flow (pointer programming)
 - self-modification (LISP)
- · Checking of the completeness of the checks and reactions
 - do all failures of every volatile operations have an exception handler?
- Human intelligence/unintelligence
 - security
 - operator errors

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Open problems

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CAD, CASE and all other CA

Basic idea:

any formal method can be used for dependability modelling, if
 a/ the rough structure remains unaltered
 b/ the description of the elements is extended by

- · local effects of faults
- · effects of erroneous input data on the state and output of the elements

Typical formalisms used in CASE/ HW-SW Co-Design

- Data-flow notation (activity charts)
- Finite state machine (state diagrams / statecharts)
- · Function-structure correlation

CASE: Classes, inheritance

HW Block diagram

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CAD, CASE and all other CA


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Qualitative data classes:

simplest:

GOOD/ FAULTY

function:

GOOD/ DATA ERROR/CTRL ERROR/

severity of the faults:

GOOD/ FAULTY/ CATASTROPHIC

etc.

Model simplification: non-deterministic behavior

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Example: Data-flow notation

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Conclusion:

Quality Control assures, that it works fine, if it works

Dependability assures, that it works not so very fine, but a little bit if it does not work

Can we really stop a high-tech car with a defective ABS on the ice???

Let be a depressed schizoid, in order to sleep well!

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